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• In March 2019, Kazakhstan’s authoritarian leader, Nursultan Nazarbayev, stepped down after three 
decades of rule and yielded power to his nominated successor, Kassym-Zhomart Tokayev. However, 
Nazarbayev has paradoxically remained the most powerful political actor in Kazakhstan.
• Kazakhstan’s model of gradual leadership succession could serve as an example to authoritarian 
states around the world, but it is particularly significant in the post-Soviet context.
• Institutional and constitutional changes that took place in the 1990s were aimed at concentrating 
power in the presidency. 
• Modifications initiated by Nazarbayev in the 2000s and 2010s sought to weaken the Kazakh presi-
dency while strengthening power vested in himself personally, in order to ensure the continuation 
of a political status quo and his family’s well-being after the transfer of power.
• Despite the careful preparation and Tokayev’s relatively smooth ascension to power, it is still too 
early to evaluate the success of the transfer due to the vast powers retained by Nazarbayev. The 
transition of power in Kazakhstan remains an ongoing process and, as such, unpredictable.
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MANAGED LEADERSHIP SUCCESSION IN KAZAKHSTAN
A MODEL FOR GRADUAL DEPARTURE?
INTRODUCTION
In March 2019, Kazakhstan’s 78-year-old President 
Nursultan Nazarbayev surprised the world by an-
nouncing his resignation after thirty years of rule. The 
decision made him one of the very few authoritarian 
leaders who after years of consolidating power would 
step down voluntarily. However, it immediately be-
came clear that although Nazarbayev was resigning as 
president, he would not be stripped of power. Thanks 
to the various posts acquired by him in the 2010s, Naz-
arbayev has paradoxically remained the most power-
ful political actor in Kazakhstan after his resignation. 
What seems to be unfolding in Kazakhstan is the first 
succession taking place in the post-Soviet space un-
der full control of an incumbent who is not leaving the 
scene.1 As such, it is certain that other senior autocrats 
in the region and beyond are keeping a close eye on 
how the succession is proceeding.
In personalist authoritarian states like Kazakhstan, 
leadership succession is problematic. Positions of lead-
ership are institutionally powerful and the systems of 
checks and balances are weak, so much is at stake. 
Unlike democracies, autocracies lack transparent and 
accepted rules of succession. As a result, times of lead-
ership succession tend to generate an internal strug-
gle within the ruling elite. Political instability, for its 
part, propels economic and societal instability that can 
have unexpected outcomes not just for the country in 
question but also for the wider region. Moreover, au-
tocrats thinking about stepping down might consider 
it wise to act otherwise. Giving up power, even par-
tially, automatically weakens the ruler’s position and 
can potentially lead to the ruler’s swift and complete 
downfall. Upon losing power, the former rulers could 
face charges linked to their likely misconduct in office. 
Considering these issues, it is no accident that many 
authoritarian leaders prefer to die in office rather than 
cede power during their lifetime.
1 The closest parallel to the succession model outside the post-Soviet world – and 
its potential inspiration – is that of Singapore. Singapore’s authoritarian leader, 
Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, stepped down gradually over the course of the 
1990s after ruling the country since the establishment of its self-governance in 
1959. It is also notable that Lee’s son, Lee Hsien Loong, has led Singapore since 
2004. https://thediplomat.com/2015/03/lee-kuan-yews-singapore-as-a-
model-for-kazakhstan/
What makes authoritarian leadership successions 
particularly challenging in the post-Soviet world is the 
relative novelty of the states concerned. Kazakhstan 
never existed as an independent nation state prior to 
1991, and since independence it has never been ruled 
by anyone other than Nazarbayev. Russia’s military in-
terventions in Georgia and Ukraine have demonstrated 
that from the Russian perspective, post-Soviet bor-
ders are not set in stone. Northern Kazakhstan hosts 
a sizeable ethnic Russian minority, albeit shrinking, 
that could hypothetically serve as a pretext for Russian 
uninvited involvement in Kazakhstan. From the per-
spective of the sovereignty of the Kazakhstani state, 
the desire for a managed leadership succession duly 
has an existential quality. No less meaningful is the 
transition from Soviet to post-Soviet leadership. Naz-
arbayev, born in 1940, is the last Soviet party boss still 
in power in the post-Soviet world. The natural exit of 
his generation will inevitably shape the future of Ka-
zakhstan’s politics.
This Briefing Paper analyzes the ongoing trans-
fer of power in Kazakhstan. It demonstrates that the 
Kazakhstani leadership succession was a carefully 
orchestrated operation that has until now unfold-
ed favourably for Nazarbayev and his family. Naz-
arbayev’s nominated successor, career diplomat 
Kassym-Zhomart Tokayev, has thus far offered Ka-
zakhstan’s politics more continuity than change. As a 
result, Kazakhstan’s experiment in a gradual transition 
of power can serve as a valuable example for other au-
tocrats in the region. However, due to the vast powers 
retained by Nazarbayev upon his resignation as well as 
the potentially powerful presidency, the transition of 
power in Kazakhstan remains an ongoing process and, 
as such, unpredictable. The concluding section analyz-
es the risks inherent in the transition of power in the 
current post-resignation period.
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1990S: CONSOLIDATING PRESIDENTIAL POWER 
The political development of Kazakhstan in the 1990s 
is a classic case of the consolidation of personalist au-
thoritarian rule. Nursultan Nazarbayev ascended to 
power in Kazakhstan in 1989 when the country was 
still a part of the Soviet Union. On the eve of Kazakh-
stan’s independence in December 1991, his position as 
the country’s president was confirmed in an uncon-
tested popular election.
The Constitution of 1993 structured Kazakhstan as 
a semi-presidential system of government. The con-
stitution gave the legislative and the judicial branches 
considerable powers to balance and control the ex-
ecutive branch headed by the President, whose time 
in office was limited to a maximum of two five-year 
terms. However, following a clash between the market 
reform-oriented President Nazarbayev and a predomi-
nantly communist parliament in 1994, Nazarbayev dis-
solved the parliament and, in March 1995, created a new 
representative body of Kazakhstan’s ethnic groups, the 
Assembly of the Peoples of Kazakhstan, the delegates 
of which he appointed personally. The Assembly called 
for a nationwide referendum on the extension of the 
President’s term in office (set to expire in 1996), which 
took place in April 1995 and unconstitutionally allowed 
Nazarbayev to remain president until 2000.
After that, another nationwide referendum was or-
ganized just four months later, in August 1995. On the 
agenda was a proposal to introduce a new constitution, 
which turned Kazakhstan into a super-presidential 
republic. According to official figures, the new con-
stitution was approved by 90% of voters. One of the 
most notable results of the constitutional reform was 
the abolishment of the Constitutional Court, formerly 
a check on both the executive and the legislative. In 
1998, constitutional amendments increased the pres-
idential term from five to seven years, raised the low-
er age limit for candidates to 40 years, and eliminated 
the upper age limit, previously set at 65. In addition, 
the 2000 presidential election was brought forward, 
which, some argue, enabled Nazarbayev to secure a 
victory despite the financial turbulence generated by 
the 1998 financial crisis.2 According to internation-
al observers, the elections of 1999 failed to meet the 
standards of free and fair elections, as had all of the 
other elections before then.
2 See e.g. the report by Human Rights Watch (1999) Kazakhstan: Freedom of the 
Media and Political Freedoms in the Prelude to the 1999 Elections, https://www.
hrw.org/report/1999/10/01/kazakhstan-freedom-media-and-political-free-
doms-prelude-1999-elections.
In July 2000, a new constitutional law granted 
Nazarbayev the status of “the First President”, which 
provided him with significant privileges and compe-
tences even after retirement from presidential office. 
In particular, he was to remain the life-long Chair of 
the Assembly of Peoples of Kazakhstan and a member 
of the Constitutional and the Security Councils. More-
over, a constitutional amendment of 2007 stipulated 
that the restriction of two presidential terms in a row 
would not apply in the case of the First President, who 
could be re-elected infinitely.
2000s: DYNASTIC SUCCESSION CONSIDERED  
AND REJECTED
The constitutional amendments adopted in the 1990s 
enabled the centralization of power in the hands of 
the institution of the president. In contrast, what 
took place in the 2010s was an institutional rebalanc-
ing that increased the power of Nazarbayev personally. 
Between these two phases, in the 2000s, Kazakhstan 
witnessed the consideration and rejection of dynastic 
succession. In the former Soviet Union, managed he-
reditary succession has been successfully implemented 
in Azerbaijan, where President Heydar Aliyev handed 
over power to his son Ilham in 2003.
Nazarbayev has three daughters, two of whom were 
discussed as potential successors in the 2000s.3 The 
president’s eldest daughter, Dariga Nazarbayeva, and 
her influential entrepreneur husband, Rakhat Aliyev, 
entered the political spotlight in 2003. However, for 
reasons unknown to the general public, Nazarbayev 
soon withdrew his support from the couple. The two 
divorced in 2007, and Aliyev faced charges of corruption 
and murder. Aliyev applied for asylum in Austria, but 
committed suicide in 2015, before the case went to trial. 
Since then, Dariga has returned to politics, serving as 
deputy prime minister, as well as a member and Chair of 
the Kazakh Senate, the upper house of the country’s bi-
cameral parliament. Some commentators insist that she 
may run for the presidency after Tokayev, while others 
argue that she can never be seen as a legitimate ruler 
in Kazakhstan’s patriarchal society. For the time being, 
her rise to the presidency remains unlikely, although as 
the head of the Senate, she is now formally the number 
two in Kazakhstan’s political hierarchy.
3 For an academic take on the potential for hereditary succession in Kazakhstan, 
see McGlinchey, E. (2011). Chaos, violence, dynasty: politics and Islam in Cen-
tral Asia. University of Pittsburgh Press.
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Nazarbayev’s second daughter, Dinara, is married to 
oil and gas oligarch Timur Kulibayev, whose net worth 
was estimated at $3.5 billion. Some political analysts argue 
that Nazarbayev did regard Kulibayev as his presidential 
heir after Aliyev fell from grace, but changed his mind 
after the 2011 Zhanaozen events that left 16 protesting oil 
workers dead and 100 injured. Kulibayev might plausibly 
nurture an ambition to rule Kazakhstan after Tokayev, but 
since he lacks widespread support among the Kazakh rul-
ing elite, this outcome is not considered likely.4
4 Robin Paxton (23 December 2011) “Analysis: Kazakh leader reinforces power 
with oil sackings” https://www.reuters.com/article/us-kazakhstan-succes-
sion/analysis-kazakh-leader-reinforces-power-with-oil-sackings-idUSTRE-
7BM0M820111223; Bne IntelliNews (24 October 2019) “Power Play in Kazakhstan” 
https://www.intellinews.com/power-play-in-kazakhstan-nazarbayev-s-
iron-rod-glimpsed-in-shadows-170248/. On Zhanaozen, see Dossym Satpayev 
& Tolganay Umbetaliyeva (2015) “The protests in Zhanaozen and the Kazakh 
oil sector: Conflicting interests in a rentier state”, Journal of Eurasian Studies, 
6(2) https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1879366515000068#-
bib19.
2010s: LIMITING THE POWER OF THE SUCCESSOR
After deeming dynastic transition a failure, Nazarbayev 
proceeded to prepare for a gradual succession that he 
himself would oversee. The planned transition was to 
have two preparatory components. First, Nazarbayev 
hoped to secure the future well-being of his family, in 
both political and financial terms. Second, the presi-
dent aspired to weaken the Kazakh presidency while 
strengthening power vested in himself personally, 
in order to manage the political succession as well as 
transform the personalist system into a more collegial 
form of authoritarian rule.
Whereas it was Singapore that set an example of 
a succession model to follow, Kazakhstan’s eastern 
neighbour Uzbekistan demonstrated elements that 
Sources: Wikimedia Commons/Ricardo Stuckert/PR, Wikimedia Commons; YouTube; Flickr/Foreign Commonwealth Office; Presidential basketball club Astana.
Nursultan Nazarbayev
First president of the Republic of Kazakhstan
Rakhat Aliyev (†2015)
Former government official; entrepreneur in bank-
ing, oil, media, and telecommunications industries 
Timur Kulibayev
Entrepreneur in banking and oil and gas industries; 
Board member of the Russian gas monopoly Gazprom
Dimash Dosanov 
Entrepreneur; General Director of the national 
oil transporter KazTransOil
Dinara Kulibayeva
Entrepreneur in banking, construction,  
and oil and gas industries
Aliya Nazarbayeva
Entrepreneur in construction and wellness 
industries; public figure
Dariga Nazarbayeva
Chairperson of the Senate of Kazakhstan; former 
entrepreneur in media and agriculture industries
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Nazarbayev apparently hoped to avoid. In 2016, Is-
lam Karimov, the Uzbek president that had ruled the 
country since its independence, died of a cardiac ar-
rest. Karimov passed away without a designated suc-
cessor, which generated a split within the Uzbek elite. 
As a result of elite negotiations behind closed doors, 
the prime minister of 13 years, Shavkhat Mirziyoyev, 
was appointed – not formally in line with the consti-
tution –  the acting president. To consolidate his pow-
er, Mirziyoyev proceeded to appoint his supporters to 
key government positions, while ousting his potential 
rivals – some of whom had enabled his accession to 
the presidency. In 2018, Karimov’s widow and both 
daughters were targeted in a corruption case.5 Since 
Nazarbayev would plausibly hope to protect his family 
and avoid elite infighting after his departure, there is 
reason to believe that he does genuinely seek to trans-
fer power to his successor during his lifetime.
In fact, Nazarbayev took the first steps to safeguard 
his family as early as 2010. This was when the parlia-
ment of Kazakhstan granted Nazarbayev the title of 
leader of the nation (Elbasy in Kazakh), which is not 
purely symbolic as it provides Nazarbayev and his fam-
ily with immunity from criminal prosecution for life. 
However, this cannot be considered a full guarantee. 
In neighbouring Kyrgyzstan, for example, the former 
president, Almazbek Atambayev, has been stripped 
of his ex-president status and thus of immunity from 
persecution after a conflict with Sooronbay Jeenbekov, 
his selected successor.
After rejecting plans for hereditary succession, 
Nazarbayev has ostensibly been playing his potential 
successors off against one another, ensuring that none 
of them would gain a clear lead.6 The strategy makes 
sense from the perspective of the political science lit-
erature, which demonstrates that the members of the 
regime’s elite pose the greatest threat to authoritarian 
leaders, especially those who are growing weaker. For 
this reason, Nazarbayev cannot and does not fully trust 
his elites. In 2016, a major cabinet reshuffle took place, 
followed by a fierce campaign against corruption that 
witnessed a sweeping wave of arrests of high-ranking 
officials. In 2018, a new law restricting the outflow of 
capital from Kazakhstan’s banks was introduced, sup-
posedly to keep the Kazakh oligarchs in check.
5 Like Nazarbayev, Karimov was originally thought to be preparing his older 
daughter, Gulnara Karimova, to assume power after him. However, Karimova fell 
out with the rest of her family in 2007, and a corruption investigation was even 
launched against her during her father’s lifetime.
6 Arkady Dubnov (6 February 2017) “Continuity in Kazakhstan: Nazarbayev’s Cu-
rious Appeal for Constitutional Reform”, Carnegie Moscow Center, https://car-
negie.ru/commentary/67906.
A major step to weaken the Kazakh presiden-
cy while strengthening Nazarbayev’s powers inde-
pendently of his office was the constitutional reform 
of 2017. Perhaps surprisingly, there was no nation-
wide referendum on the amendments, but a Soviet 
style “popular discussion” instead, lasting for one 
month. The amendments that were introduced gave 
government ministers more power to manage the 
economy and social issues, while increasing par-
liamentary control over the government by giving 
members of the parliament the right to hold votes of 
confidence in the cabinet. The president, for his part, 
retained control over foreign policy, national secu-
rity, and defence, while remaining as the supreme 
arbiter in state affairs. 
Nazarbayev’s strategy was to anchor his political 
power in a plethora of institutions across the three 
branches of government. He became the Chair of Nut 
Otan, Kazakhstan’s party of power, upon its estab-
lishment in 2007, and has remained in the position 
ever since. Retaining control over the party is im-
portant since it dominates the Kazakh parliament. In 
the executive sphere, Nazarbayev has been appoint-
ed lifetime leader of the country’s Security Council, 
which coordinates the implementation of state policy 
on national security and defence. To ensure his pres-
ence in the juridical sphere, Nazarbayev holds lifelong 
membership of the Constitutional Council.
2019: STEPPING DOWN, AND AFTER
The posts accumulated by Nazarbayev in the 2000s en-
sured that he would not be stripped of power after his 
announced resignation in March 2019. Furthermore, 
despite the election of his designated successor, Kass-
ym-Zhomart Tokayev, as President, power remained 
concentrated in Nazarbayev’s hands. To date, Kazakh-
stan’s first president exercises considerable influence 
as a member of the Constitutional Council, the Chair of 
the ruling party Nur Otan, the lifelong head of the con-
stitutional Security Council, and the Elbasy. This insti-
tutional safety net stretches across the three branches 
of government and enables him to play the role of a 
veto player in Kazakhstan’s state affairs.
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Although Nazarbayev did not openly name a suc-
cessor until his resignation, it can be assumed that 
the power transfer was prepared rather carefully. In 
June 2019, Tokayev was announced as the winner of 
the presidential election which, according to the ob-
servers’ mission of the Organization for Cooperation 
and Security in Europe, had failed to meet democrat-
ic standards. Shortly after his election as president, 
Tokayev claimed that the decision about his designa-
tion had already been made in 2015. “It was a matter 
of time. We were waiting for the [right] moment,” he 
commented in an exclusive interview with Euronews.7 
Despite the careful preparation and Tokayev’s 
relatively smooth ascension to power, it is still too 
early to view the transition of power as a success 
for Nazarbayev. The way in which the transfer hap-
pened galvanized Kazakhstan’s dormant opposition 
and civil society, which staged a number of protests 
in 2019. A completely new youth movement, “Wake 
up, Kazakhstan!”, emerged as a spontaneous reaction 
to the successor operation and the renaming of the 
capital as Nur-Sultan. Although Tokayev responded 
to the protests with Nazarbayev-style repression, he 
also endorsed the need for reforms – including in the 
political sector. This might augur certain changes in 
the future.
In addition, there is some evidence to suggest that 
tensions are emerging between the different sub-
groups of the Kazakh elite. In October 2019, Tokayev 
criticized the development of the capital and ordered 
a corruption investigation into a $1.5 billion light rail 
project that would target members of Nazarbayev’s 
inner circle. The following month, he signed a law 
making ministers and governors directly responsible 
for corruption among their subordinates, while in 
December, the acting president reshuffled key gov-
ernment positions. Using corruption cases to harass 
political opponents is standard practice in authori-
tarian regimes, while appointing loyalists in positions 
of power is an essential step in consolidating one’s 
rule in both democracies and non-democracies. Al-
though Tokayev remains outpowered by Nazarbayev, 
Kazakhstan’s super-presidential form of government 
and Nazarbayev’s age are working for the benefit of the 
current president. As a result, the Kazakh elite could 
well shift their primary allegiance from Nazarbayev to 
Tokayev even during the former’s lifetime.
7 Galina Polonskaya (17 June 2019) “President of Kazakhstan took EU advice on 
political transformation”, Euronews exclusive interview, https://www.eu-
ronews.com/2019/06/15/president-of-kazakhstan-takes-eu-advice-on-politi-
cal-transformation-euronews-exclusive. 
At the same time, however, Tokayev made one ma-
jor concession that increased the power of the former 
president. Just one day after ordering an investigation 
into the light rail project, he signed amendments to 
the decree “On Certain Issues of the Personnel Policy 
in the System of Public Administration”. The amend-
ments granted veto power over high-level political 
appointments to Nazarbayev as the Chair of the Secu-
rity Council. As a result, Tokayev needs Nazarbayev’s 
approval for appointments in the presidential adminis-
tration, the security service, the Prosecutor-General’s 
Office, and for regional governors. Some analysts have 
interpreted the decree as an attempt by Nazarbayev to 
contain his successor.8
CONCLUSION
Nazarbayev’s aim has been to construct a system that 
allows him to exercise power from various positions 
that belong to him personally rather than from those 
that come with the presidential office. This part of his 
model of gradual succession has prevailed. However, 
considering that Nazarbayev’s aim is also to ensure Ka-
zakhstan’s political, social and economic stability for 
the future, the former president is not retreating from 
power quickly enough. Considering the vast pow-
ers vested in Elbasy personally, his departure would 
create a power vacuum that nobody would be able to 
fill overnight. In such a situation, Kazakhstan’s elite 
would have to negotiate a new power-sharing ar-
rangement. Although research shows that such nego-
tiations are usually successful,9 even a short period of 
confusion might pose a threat to the political stability 
of the country. This could in turn lead to economic 
and social turbulence with unpredictable repercus-
sions. Finally, the future of Nazarbayev’s close circle 
of friends and relatives remains an open question. At 
present, Nazarbayev and his family are protected by 
the title of Elbasy, but due to the omnipresence of cor-
ruption,10 their security and wealth cannot be guaran-
teed in the future. 
Authoritarian leaders in the post-Soviet space and 
beyond are apparently following Kazakhstan’s experi-
ment with leadership succession closely. The handover 
8 Joanna Lillis (25 October 2019) “Who really is Kazakhstan’s leader of the nation?” 
Eurasianet https://eurasianet.org/who-really-is-kazakhstans-leader-of-the-
nation.
9 Andrea Kendall-Taylor & Erica Frantz (10 September 2015) “When Dictators Die”, 
Foreign Policy https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/09/10/when-dictators-die/.
10 GAN Business Anti-Corruption Portal (July 2016) “Kazakhstan Corruption Re-
port” https://www.ganintegrity.com/portal/country-profiles/kazakhstan/.
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of the presidential office took place rather frictionless-
ly, but it is unclear how the situation will evolve in 
the future, both during Nazarbayev’s lifetime and after 
his departure. The way that Nazarbayev, Tokayev, and 
other members of Kazakhstan’s ruling elite navigate 
through the transfer of power will provide other au-
thoritarian leaders with material for analyzing both 
what to avoid and what to push through. In any case, 
it is the specific local political, social and economic 
context that will determine the feasibility of different 
options.
Despite the rearrangement of government institu-
tions as a part of the gradual transfer of power, the 
leadership succession issue in Kazakhstan has not 
yet been fundamentally resolved. Only time will tell 
if and how Nazarbayev’s legacy will be secured and 
preserved.
